Connected and automated vehicles

Cover of Evaluation of the European C‑ITS Platform including Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
Evaluation of the European C‑ITS Platform including Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
  • Publication no: AP-R584-18
  • ISBN: 978-1-925671-81-0
  • Published: 16 October 2018

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has published a Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis standard – ETSI TR 102 893 V1.2.1. It outlines the outcome of the Threats, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis of the 5.9 GHz DSRC C-ITS communications (ITS-G5/M5). Austroads is interested in the broader C-ITS paradigm comprising of hybrid communications (ITS-G5/M5and LTE/4G/5G).

This report presents an evaluation of the ETSI TVRA for the European C-ITS platform in the Australian context, including an evaluation of the threats posed to vehicle and roadside ITS stations. Areas of interest not covered in the ETSI TVRA are provided, as well as a high-level overview of the central ITS stations, personal ITS stations and cellular communications. Areas of interest to Australia and New Zealand requiring further detailed examination are also described.

  • Summary
  • 1. Introduction
    • 1.1 Project Background
    • 1.2 Project Scope
  • 2. Project Overview
  • 3. Literature Review
    • 3.1 EU, US and Japan Proposals
      • 3.1.1 Europe
      • Hybrid communication
      • Beyond C-ITS, towards Connected, Cooperative and Automated Mobility (CCAM)
      • G5/M5 versus 5G and coexistence issues
      • Physical and virtual, or soft, infrastructure
      • Blockchain
      • Summary conclusion from the C-ITS Platform
      • 3.1.2 IEEE/US Proposal
      • US Security
      • US approval process
      • 3.1.3 Harmonisation and Comparison Between EU and US Proposals
      • 3.1.4 Japan
      • 760 MHz ITS Connect
      • 3.1.5 5.8 GHz v 5.9 GHz Interference Issues
      • 3.1.6 Automotive Manufacturer Proposals for ‘the Extended Car’
    • 3.2 C-ITS Trials/Pilots in ANZ
      • 3.2.1 New South Wales
      • 3.2.2 Victoria
      • 3.2.3 Queensland
      • 3.2.4 South Australia
      • 3.2.5 Western Australia
      • 3.2.6 Australian Capital Territory
      • 3.2.7 Northern Territory
      • 3.2.8 New Zealand
      • 3.2.9 Overview of Trials from TVRA Perspective
    • 3.3 Proposed C-ITS High-Level Architecture
      • 3.3.1 ISO 21217 C-ITS Architecture
      • 3.3.2 Impact of ITS Station Architecture and Hybrid Communications on the ETSI TVRA
    • 3.4 Security Credential Management Systems
      • 3.4.1 HTG1/6
      • 3.4.2 End-to-end Technical and Organization Security Policy Framework
      • 3.4.3 End-to-end Technical and Organization Security Policy Framework
      • 3.4.4 Implementation in the USA
      • 3.4.5 Identity Management in ITS
      • 3.4.6 C-ITS Compliance Assessment
      • 3.4.7 Conformity Assessment/Certificate Policy Implications and What This Means for the Austroads
      • TVRA Context
    • 3.5 ETSI TR 102 893 v1.2.1 TVRA Overview Analysis
      • 3.5.1 Review of Security Objectives from ETSI TVRA
      • 3.5.2 Revision of the ETSI TVRA Method
      • 3.5.3 Reference Points and Attack Vectors
      • 3.5.4 Areas of Austroads Interest that were not Covered in the ETSI TVRA
      • Cellular communications and hybrid communications paradigm
      • Central ITS Stations
      • Personal ITS Stations
      • Outlining what G5/M5 limitations of the EU TVRA mean for Austroads
      • Developments since EU TVRA and what this means for the Austroads TVRA context
    • 3.6 C-ITS Platform Certificate Policy
      • 3.6.1 C-ITS Working Group – Security
      • Trust model for C-ITS: roles
    • 3.7 Key Findings – Literature Review
      • 3.7.1 Summarised List of Key Findings – Literature Review
      • 3.7.2 Out of Scope Key Actions/Issues Identified – Literature Review
  • 4. Stakeholder Consultation
    • 4.1 Key Findings – Stakeholder Consultations
  • 5. Assessment
    • 5.1 Evaluation of ETSI TVRA (2017-03 version) for Austroads – Vehicle and Roadside ITS-S
    • 5.2 Areas of Austroads Interest not Covered in the ETSI TVRA (2017-03 Version) – Central and Personal
      • ITS-S
      • 5.2.1 Indicative Threat Attack Diagrams
    • 5.3 Areas of Interest where Further Examinations are Required
      • 5.3.1 Internet of Things
      • 5.3.2 Core Systems Support
      • 5.3.3 Japanese VICS and ITS ‘Connect’ Systems
      • 5.3.4 5G
      • 5.3.5 C-V2X, LTE V2X, 5GAA
      • 5.3.6 ExVE
      • 5.3.7 Policy and Operational Threats
    • 5.4 Two Key Policy Implications for ANZ
      • 5.4.1 Policy Choices and Consequences
      • Conformity assessment and certificate policy
      • Privacy
      • 5.4.2 Strategy Recommendations
  • 6. Conclusions
    • 6.1 Key Findings
      • 6.1.1 Literature Review
      • 6.1.2 Stakeholder Consultation
      • 6.1.3 Assessment
    • 6.2 Key Conclusions
  • References
  • Appendix A List of Acronyms
  • Appendix B Literature Review – All Key Findings
  • Appendix C Stakeholder Consultation Comments
  • Appendix D Roads Australia Transport Reform Policy Chapter – Security
  • Appendix E DIRDC Led Project on Security